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This paper models trade and FDI in a world consisting of two 
symmetric countries. Using a monopolistic competition model of 
international trade which includes positive trade costs and endogenous 
multinational firms, we introduce an intermediate good and allow 
firms to fragment production internationally. The result is that under 
certain conditions, identical countries engage in both intra-industry 
FDI and intra-industry, intra-firm trade. This result provides a 
theoretical explanation for a well-observed but little explained 
phenomenon in the overlap between the theory of international trade 
and the theory of multinational enterprises.  Examination of welfare 
demonstrates that firms make location choices that happen to 
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The motivation for this paper is a series of stylized facts about multinationals,
trade and FDI that are interesting and often inadequately explained by most
trade theory. First, multinationals are of considerable importance in interna-
tional trade, with some two-thirds of trade being conducted by multinationals.
Yet multinationals are largely absent from all but a small branch of trade theory
- key papers that deal with multinationals are mentioned below. Secondly, there
is considerable similarity between trade ﬂows and patterns of FDI: most trade
is between the advanced countries, and so is most FDI. And there appears to
be both two-way trade and two-way FDI between pairs of countries at industry
level. Yet the papers that do treat multinationals generally posit FDI (or rather,
the ensuing sales from foreign subsidiaries) as an explicit alternative to trade.
Finally, a styalised fact that has recently caught the attention of others, around
a third of world trade is intra-ﬁrm trade. A reﬁnement to this last statistic
that particularly supports the model developed in this paper is that over 20%
of US exports comprises of intra-ﬁrm sales of inputs from the American parent
company to a foreign subsidiary; and almost 20% of US imports are sales from
foreign parent companies to US-based subsidiaries.
Before expounding our model, we examine brieﬂy previous papers that have
sought to integrate multinationals into models of international trade, and which
attempt to endogenise the location pattern of ﬁrms and their decisions to inte-
grate across national borders, either horizontally or vertically.
Prior to the 1980s, the general equilibrium theory of international trade was
not well equipped to deal with the rising importance of multinationals in general
and to international trade in particular. Batra and Ramachandran (1980) is an
isolated, early attempt to integrate multinationals into a perfectly-competitive
Heckscher-Ohlin framework. As Markusen (1984) points out, “formal trade
theory has largely failed to provide a rationale as to why these corporations
exist at all”.
There are a very small number of papers from the 1980s that take some
steps forward in explaining the existence of multinationals. Helpman (1984) and
Markusen (1984) are two papers that integrate multinational enterprises into a
general equilibrium mode of international trade. Helpman (1984) develops a
simple model to identify circumstances in which corporations ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to establish subsidiaries abroad. Diﬀerences in relative factor endowments give
rise to diﬀerences in factor prices which ﬁrms can exploit by shifting activities
abroad. This is vertical FDI motivated by diﬀerences in factor prices. More
innovatively, the contemporaneous paper by Markusen (1984) introduces ﬁrm-
level economies of scale in the form of an intangible input that can be used
simultaneously in more than one production facility. Under certain conditions,
a multi-plant equilibrium with horizontal FDI emerges.
1The next paper to make an innovative and incisive contribution was Brainard
(1993). Using a partial equilibrium model with identical countries, she frames
the ﬁrm’s location decision choice in terms of scale versus proximity, to examine
the circumstances under which multinational ﬁrms arise endogenously. She ﬁnds
that, for plausible combinations of parameters, multiple production facilities are
a ﬁrm’s optimal choice.
Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000) contributed two important papers that
allow multinationals to arise endogenously. Markusen and Venables (1998) uses
a Cournot oligopoly model of the ﬁrm with homogeneous goods and positive
trade costs, Markusen and Venables (2000) introduces trade costs to the Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition model. In a two country, general equilibrium
model, horizontal multinationals arise for selected combinations of endowments
as an alternative means of supplying the export market. The result — that
multinationals arise as an alternative method of supplying the export market
- ﬁts with the concerns of the business research community (see, for example,
Chan Kim and Hwang (1992)) which habitually studies mode of supply to export
markets from the ﬁrm’s perspective. The theory seemed to imply that FDI (and
the resulting sales from foreign aﬃliates) is a substitute for international trade.
The past few years have witnessed an upsurge in interest in multinational
ﬁrms and their behaviour, producing a plethora of interesting papers.1 This is
partly the realisation of the importance of multinationals; and partly the fact
that there are now some well-developed tools available to treat multinationals.
Most of the papers, for example, Helpman et.al. (2003), continue to explain
FDI as an alternative exporting.
Yet empirical investigation, such as Clausing (2000) and Blonigen (2001),
has largely failed to ﬁnd substitution between FDI and trade. Instead, a rather
puzzling pattern of complementarity appears to be present in the data.2
There are two channels through which the FDI activities of a multinational
may stimulate trade. The ﬁrst is that production abroad may require imported
inputs. These inputs can come either from within the ﬁrm that is responsible for
the FDI; or from other ﬁrms from the source country (or from third countries)
that are established suppliers to the main ﬁrm.
The second channel is that the beneﬁts to the ﬁrm of proximity to market
may extend beyond the savings in transport or trade costs on the good actually
produced in the local market. The local manufacturing presence may lead to
spillovers to other products made by the same ﬁrm, that in turn increase demand
for the other (imported) products. Examples of spillovers that may stimulate
1See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (2002); Helpman, et.al (2003); Yeaple (2003);
Hanson, et.al. (2004); and Antras and Helpman (2004).
2Brainard (1997) identiﬁes two-way FDI between pairs of countries that parallels trade
between the two countries.
2trade in other products include shorter delivery times due to better organised lo-
cal warehousing; the ease of adapting a product to the local market, for example
the translation of instructions into other languages; and simply an increase in
brand acceptability that may come from having a local manufacturing presence.
My own intuition is that ﬁrms engaging in FDI tend to rely on inputs sourced
from their own country. This could be ongoing, long-term relationships with
suppliers, or the import of components from within the ﬁrm. Either way, it
is plausible that a new, green-ﬁeld venture abroad stimulates additional trade
in components. Whether or not this is a net increase in trade depends on the
volume of components required by the new plant, and on the volume of imports
that may no longer be required as they have been displaced by the locally-
produced articles. This in turn will depend partly on whether a ﬁrm is able
to produce locally at an overall cost that is lower than that of the imported
article, and on the responsiveness of demand to any price change. In a global
situation characterised by growing aggregate demand and falling costs of oper-
ating abroad, it is plausible to observe simultaneously an increase in FDI and
an increase in trade.
The aim of this paper is to create a model in which FDI can occur in combi-
nation with international trade. Motivated by the three stylised facts speciﬁed
above that are largely absent from trade models, this paper develops a model
with identical countries that allows international trade and FDI to occur as
complements. The speciﬁc contribution of this paper is to reﬁne the proximity
verses scale trade-oﬀ that was ﬁrst noted by Brainard (1993).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 analyses the conditions for the various types of instantaneous
equilibria that can occur. Section 4 considers how the equilibria will be inﬂu-
enced by changes in key parameters. Section 5 examines the volumes of trade
and FDI, and welfare. Section 6 concludes.
32 The Model
The model has two symmetric countries, Home (h)a n dF o r e i g n( f). Each
country is endowed with the same amount of the single factor, Labour (L).
There are two ﬁnal goods sectors, X and Z, and an intermediate good, C. Z
is a homogeneous good, and X is a diﬀerentiated good. The intermediate good
C is used in the production of the ﬁnal good X.
2.1 Consumer behaviour
Preferences of the representative consumer in each country are modelled as
a Cobb-Douglas nest of Z consumption and a CES composite of X-varieties.
Speciﬁcally:















with the subscript i denoting the varieties of X.
Consumers maximise utility U subject to the budget constraint




Utility maximisation implies that a ﬁxed proportion β of consumption expen-
diture E is spent on goods from the X sector, and the rest is spent on Z.T h e









where the subscript j denotes a single variety of X . Due to the functional
form of the utility function, the demand for a particular variety of X depends
on the price of that variety of X and also on the price of all the other varieties
of X available to the consumer in that market.
3See Appendix 1 for the derivation of the demand function.
42.2 Producer behaviour
Production of Z is characterised by constant returns to scale and perfect com-
petition. It takes a one unit of L paid wages w, with a unit input coeﬃcient of
az =1 We take w =1as the numeraire. Z is a homogeneous good and can
be traded costlessly.
Production of good X comprises two stages: the ﬁrst stage consists of the
production of an intermediate good C; and the second stage, which we denote
as A, involves further processing of the intermediate good. Think of C as a
Component, such as the chassis or engine, used as an input in the production
of the ﬁnal good, X,s u c ha sac a r . T h i n ko fA as the assembly of car parts to
make the car.
The two stages of production are spatially separable, and each stage requires
its own plant. We refer to these as the components factory and the assembly
plant respectively. A ﬁrm establishing production in the X sector incurs three
types of ﬁxed costs: there is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc general cost, G;aﬁxed cost Fc
associated with each components factory; and a ﬁxed cost Fa associated with
each assembly plant.
The component C is manufactured using ac units of labour. It takes one
unit of C, plus further processing which requires aa units of labour, to produce
one unit of X.E a c h ﬁrm in the X sector produces its own intermediate good
C.4 The marginal cost of producing a unit of X is therefore split between the
marginal cost of producing the component and the marginal cost of assembly,
and we deﬁne ax = ac + aa.
The option to fragment the production of X g i v e sr i s et ot h r e et y p e so f
ﬁrm endogenously determined within them o d e l . F i r s t ,t h e r ec a nb en a t i o n a l
ﬁrms, which take advantage of scale economies, producing all their output in
a single location, and exporting the ﬁnished good X to the other country; we
denote these ﬁrms as n−types. Secondly, there may be ﬁrms that concentrate
the production of components in a single factory, thus take advantage of scale
economies in the production of components; but establish a second assembly
assembly plant in the foreign market and thus avoid trade costs associated with
the export of the ﬁnal product. Such ﬁrms are beneﬁting from the separability
of the two stages of production, and we denote these ﬁrms as v−types. Finally
there can be traditional horizontal multinational ﬁrms, which avoid trade costs
completely by producing the whole product from start to ﬁnish in each market;
we denote these ﬁrms as m − type.
The table below summarises the characteristics and costs of each type of
ﬁrm.5
4Demand for each variety of C is thus determined by demand for the ﬁnal good.
5T h i st a b l ew a sc r e a t e di nW o r da n ds a v e da sﬁle ”table of type of ﬁrm.doc” on the m-drive.
5Characteristics of firm  Type of firm  Short type  Trade  FDI 
 
Manufacturers all components in a single 
factory in Home; finishes them in an 
adjacent assembly plant; services the 














Manufacturers all components in a single 
factory in Home; finishes those destined 
for the home market in an adjacent 
assembly plant; services the foreign 
market by shipping components and 
















Manufacturers components in both 
countries; finishes them in separate 
















The ﬁnal good X can be traded; trade costs are of the iceberg type where t
represents the additional fraction of X that must be shipped per unit so that one
unit of X arrives. Thus for sales abroad, 1+t units of X must be produced and
shipped for every unit of X that is sold in the foreign market. The good C can
be moved across borders, although C is not traded between ﬁrms as each ﬁrm
produces its own intermediate good.6 The trade cost associated with shipping
the component alone is modelled as αt,w h e r e0 <α<1.
It is the existence of v−types of ﬁrm that is most interesting in terms of the
area we are investigating, in that v − type ﬁrms are engaged in both FDI and
trade. The question we pose is, under what conditions do v −type ﬁrms exist?
Assuming proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms, the answer to this question is that ﬁrms will
choose to be v − type when this is the choice that results in maximum proﬁts.
We now consider the production decision of a typical ﬁrm. The production
decision can be thought of as having two stages: in the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms decide in
which market to locate its plant physically; in the second stage ﬁrms optimise
6We justify the strong assumption that the intermediate good is not traded betwen ﬁrms
on two counts. First, the incidence of intra-ﬁrm trade is very high; and second, to introduce
inter-ﬁrm trade into the model would cause unnecessary complications.
6the price charged to consumers in each market. We solve this by working
backwards, by working out ﬁr s tt h ep r i c ee a c ht y p eo fﬁrm would charge in
each market; we then use these expressions for price to create expressions for
operating proﬁts by type of ﬁrm; ﬁnally we using the expressions for operating
proﬁts to inform the location decision.
2.2.1 The pricing decision
The ﬁrst step is to calculate the prices of a typical variety sold in the home mar-
ket and abroad for each type of ﬁrm. We solve producer j’s proﬁt maximisation
























j are the price of variety j in the home and foreign markets
respectively; ch
j is the variable cost associated with producing goods for home
consumption and is equal to axw;a n dc
f
j is the variable production costs for
goods to be exported. Note that c
f
j will diﬀer in accordance with the location
of production, as will ﬁxed costs. The expressions for c
f
j are axw(1 + t) for
n − type ﬁrms; axw(1 + αt) for v − type ﬁrms; and axw for m − type ﬁrms.7
Dropping the subscript j, the ﬁrst-order conditions are:
δΠ
δPh =0= ⇒ xh




δPf =0= ⇒ xf
pPf + xf = cfxp
where xp is the partial derivative of xj with respect to pj (i.e., xp =
δxj
δpj ).






Now multiply top and bottom of the second term by pj:
7T h ev a r i a b l ec o s to fp r o d u c t i o nf o rv − type ﬁrms is acw + aaw∗(1 + αt) ;i fw ea s s u m e
w = w∗, this expression reduces to axw(1 + αt). Similarly, the variable cost of production















ε .W h e n ε = σ,





where c represents marginal cost, which diﬀers according to the country of
production and country of sale.
The price of a single variety will be diﬀerent in the diﬀerent markets; the
price in the export market diﬀers with the location of production. Price can












where i is the country of origin of the ﬁrm, j is the market in which the output
is sold, and y i st h et y p eo fﬁrm. The various combinations of suﬃxes and
subscripts provide a speciﬁc formula for the price by country of production,
country of sale, and type of ﬁrm. Recalling our choice of numeraire (w =1 );
noting that for symmetric countries w = w∗; and deﬁning units such that ax =
σ−1











The price charged to foreign consumers varies in accordance with the location
of production; when production is in H and ﬁnished goods are exported to
F, varieties of X imported to F are more expensive than locally produced
ones. Conversely, when goods from a foreign supplier are manufactured locally,
they are available at the same price as local varieties. When components are
imported for local assembly, the price is between the two.
2.2.2 The location decision
Given that the price that is charged to the consumer is diﬀerent depending on
where production is located, and that the ﬁxed costs associated with production
diﬀers with location, we assume that ﬁrms pick the location conﬁguration that
8maximises their proﬁt. Thus the next step is to calculate the operating proﬁt







ij ) ∗ xij (5)


















1−σ = Φ; Φv =( 1+αt)
1−σ = Φ1; (7)
we obtain expressions for operating proﬁt by sales type and by type of ﬁrm.













The operating proﬁts on sales to the foreign market vary with the location




































i ,we obtain the following expressions for total operating




















8Ii n t r o d u c et h es y m b o l sΦ and Φ1 to facilitate comparison with other models that use
t h es a m es y m b o l . Φ can be understood as the relative freeness (aka ”phi-ness”) of trade. It
also simpliﬁes the look of several lines of algebra, although the results and propositions in this
paper related directly to t.
9Consider the sum in the denominator of the expressions above, ie.
SN
i=1 P1−σ
i .N o t e
that the number of ﬁrms will be diﬀerent in each type of equliibrium, because N depends on
ﬁxed cost, and the ﬁxed cost varies depending on the method of supplying the foreign market.
Consider for a moment an expression for N.W e o b t a i n N =
βL
σF . Therefore note that
Nn 6= Nv 6= Nm, because Fn 6= Fv 6= Fm. For possible future use, we deﬁne the number of
ﬁrms producing in the H market and F maket respectively:
N = n + m + v; N∗ = n∗ + m∗ + v∗
9To recap, the table below provides a summary of operating proﬁta n dﬁxed costs







(from sales in two markets)
Total ﬁxed costs
(deﬁne Fc = Fa + D;










σ 3F + D + G
m − type 2
∆ ∗
βE
σ 4F +2 D + G
I use the above expressions for operating proﬁts and ﬁxed costs in section 4 to
characterise the conditions for each type of equilibrium. Before conducting a
formal analysis of the various equilibria, I provide some intuition as to how the
model works.
2.2.3 Intuition
Before conducting a formal analysis of the model to establish the various equi-
libria, I provide some intuition as to how the model works by means of a brief
thought-experiment. Consider initially a situation where ﬁrms face a simple
choice of either supplying the foreign market by shipping the ﬁnished product; or
producing the ﬁnished good locally. There is no option to fragment production,
and ﬁrms are either n − type or m − type.
Begin by imagine trade costs are zero. For an individual ﬁrm, this means
that there is no cost diﬀerence between supplying merchandise to the home
market or to the foreign market. Think of this as two small adjacent countries:
it may be that a Belgian ﬁrm can just as easily deliver to an address in Lux-
embourg as one in Belgium. In such case, there will never be an incentive for
a ﬁrm to set up a second plant. In equilibrium, all ﬁrms are n − types.T h e
export market will always be serviced by production from the home country,
but as trade costs are zero,the price of the goods on the foreign market will be
t h es a m ea st h a tc h a r g e da th o m e .
Now imagine that trade costs increase slightly from zero. Let us assume
that a very small increase in trade costs will not be suﬃcient to induce ﬁrms
to set up a second plant abroad: when trade costs are very low, this will not
aﬀect a ﬁrm’s location decision, and all ﬁrms remain n − types. But as trade
costs grow, the price charged to foreign consumers for imported good increases;
foreign demand falls and operating proﬁts are lower.
At some point, trade costs become high enough that it becomes optimal for
a ﬁrm to incur extra expense of a second production facility abroad and become
10an m − type ﬁrm. This switch occurs because the extra ﬁxed costs due to the
second plant are oﬀset by the additional proﬁts that come from the sales abroad,
now that the price charged to foreign consumers is lower. This switch occurs
at a certain level of trade costs, which I call tcrit0.T h e l e v e l o f tcrit0 depends
primarily on the ﬁxed costs.
To summarise, so long as trade costs are low enough, the n−type equilibrium
prevails. But if trade costs rise suﬃciently, the m − type equilibrium prevails.
Essentially there is a trade-oﬀ between scale and proximity. The advantage of
scale is that there is only one plant to sustain, whereas the beneﬁto fp r o x i m i t y
is that trade costs are avoided.
Next consider the location choice faced by ﬁrms from a starting position of
very high trade costs. When trade costs are high enough to be be prohibitive,
the only option to serve an export market will be to have a second manufacturing
base abroad. The world will be populated by m − type ﬁrms. Now imagine
trade costs falling gradually. A small change will not alter location choices;
but eventually trade costs will be suﬃciently low that it will be advantageous
to a ﬁrm to consolidate production in a single location and supply the foreign
market by means of shipping. Again the switch occurs at a certain level of
trade costs. It turns out that in the model developed in this paper, there is a
single switching point between n − type and m − type ﬁrms, which I call tcrit.
We now turn to the more complex model, where fragmentation of production
is possible. The X good is produced in two stages. Stage 1 is production of the
component, which requires a components factory. Stage 2 is assembly, which
requires an assembly plant. The components factory and assembly pant each
entail a separate ﬁxed cost. When trade costs are zero, an n−type equilibrium
will prevail as explained above, as there is no incentive for a ﬁrm to established
second production units.
Now imagine rising trade costs. Assume for a moment (i) the ﬁxed cost of
the components factory is large relative to that of the assembly plant; and (ii)
the cost of transporting the component alone is small relative to transporting the
ﬁnished good. When trade costs reach a certain level, it will become optimal for
a ﬁrm to set up a second assembly plant abroad. The ﬁrm becomes a v −type.
As a v − type,t h eﬁrm pays trade costs for shipping the component, plus the
ﬁxed cost of a second assembly plant. We call this level of trade costs tcrit1.
Continue to imagine a steady increase in trade costs. Assume the ﬁrm
remains a v−type at least for small increases from tcrit1. But when trade costs
are very high, it becomes optimal for the ﬁrm to invest in a second components
factory, thus avoiding trade costs altogether. The ﬁrm becomes an m−type at
a certain level of trade costs, which we call tcrit2.
We can think of tcrit1 and tcrit2 as ”switching points” from n−type to v−type
and from v − type to m − type respectively. It turns out that these ”switching
11points” between are each uniquely deﬁned, whether we imagine starting from one
type or the other. The levels tcrit1and tcrit2 depend on various key parameters
in the model. Most importantly, they depend on the relative importance of the
ﬁxed costs associated with setting up the second plants; and the proportion of
trade cost associated with shipping the component alone.
Finally, relax the assumptions that the components factory is relatively ex-
pensive and that trade costs for the component alone are relatively low. Start
again by imagining zero trade costs that increase. For low trade costs, ﬁrms
are n − types. As trade costs rise, at some point it becomes optimal for ﬁrms
to deviate from the n − type. But whether it is optimal for the ﬁrm to be-
comes a v − type or an m − type depends critically on the interplay between
the parameters. If the ﬁxed cost of the components factors is not suﬃciently
high relative to the cost of the assembly plant, or if the cost of transporting the
component alone is not small enough relative to the cost of transporting the
ﬁnished good, it is possible to envisage that the ﬁrm will switch directly from
n−type to m−type as trade costs rise, and that there is no parameter space in
which v − type ﬁrms are the optimal choice. In a later section we explore the
conditions under which there are sets of parameters which can support v−type
ﬁrms as we imagine trade costs rising. The existence of v −type ﬁrms depends
on the relationship between the other parameters.
To complete the thought-experiment , consider brieﬂy the binary choice from
the extreme perspective of the other key parameter, ﬁxed costs. Imagine for a
moment that the ﬁxed costs of establishing a second plant are zero. Zero ﬁxed
costs for a plant are not unreasonable if we consider that all costs of production
are related to volume, and hence are included in marginal costs. 10 When
ﬁxed costs are zero, a ﬁrm will always opt to establish a second plant in the
export market, and the world is populated by m−type ﬁrms. Imagine now ﬁxed
cost increasing a little. A small increase in ﬁx e dc o s t sw o u l dn o t ,w ea s s u m e ,
change the equilibrium. But if we imagine ﬁxed costs increasing steadily, then
once ﬁxed costs reach at a certain level, a ﬁrm would ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to take
advantage of the economies of scale that accrue from producing in a single
location.
2.2.4 Summary of ﬁrm types
1. Produce the ﬁnal product in its own country, and sell at home and export
abroad. This is an n − type ﬁrm, with production only in its home country. In
this equilibrium, there is international trade but no multinational ﬁrms.
2. Produce the intermediate good at home, assemble in 2 places; this is a
vertically integrated ﬁrm, or v−type,i nt h a ti ti sd i ﬀerent stages of production
10There is still an overhead, or ﬁxed cost of being a ﬁrm, denoted as G in this model.
Overheads must remain positive for the model to be deﬁned.
12that take place in diﬀerent countries. When this equilibrium occurs, there will
be both trade (in the intermediate input) and multinational ﬁrms.
3. Produce the intermediate good in 2 places, and assemble in 2 places. This
is a horizontally integrated ﬁrm, or traditional multinational, an m − type.I n
this equilibrium, we have multinational ﬁrms but no international trade.
4. The fourth option, which I include here for completeness, but will not
examine further for the time being, is to produce all abroad, re-import to home.
Note that this will occur only if there are diﬀerences in factor prices or en-
dowments; for the moment we consider only symmetrical countries, and hence
ignore this possibility.
133 Instantaneous Equilibria
This section is set out as follows. First, I begin by assuming all ﬁrms are
n − types, and characterise the n − type equilibrium; then I ask, under what
conditions would a ﬁrm want to deviate from that equilibrium to become a
v −type ﬁrm? I next ask the reverse question: if all ﬁrms are v −types, under
what conditions would a ﬁrm want deviate to become a n − type? Combining
the answers to these two questions allows me to derive an expression that deﬁnes
tcrit1. Secondly I assume all ﬁrms are m−types, and characterise the m−type
equilibrium. Then I ask, under what conditions would a ﬁrm want to deviate
from that equilibrium to become a v − type ﬁrm. Then I ask the reverse
question: if all ﬁrms are if all ﬁrms are v −types, under what conditions would
a ﬁrm want deviate to become an m−type? These questions allow me to derive
an expression for tcrit2.
Thirdly, we show that for focal-case parameter values, tcrit1is less than tcrit2
and establish a condition on α that deﬁnes precisely when tcrit1 <t crit2. In
the ﬁnal part of this section, I establish the conditions under which a v − type
equilibrium prevails; speciﬁcally we show that a v −type equilibrium can occur
for intermediate values of t i.e., when tcrit1 <t<t crit2 ,p r o v i d e dtcrit1 <t crit2
n−type equilibrium I now characterise the conditions for the various types
of equilibria that may occur. To begin, imagine an equilibrium in which all
ﬁrms are n − types.A n n − type ﬁrm concentrates production of ﬁnal good
X in its home country. In this equilibrium, there is international trade but
no multinational ﬁrms. Assuming free entry, the number of ﬁrms will adjust
endogenously to yield zero proﬁts for each ﬁrm.11 Hence the free entry condition










=2 F + D + G (11)
this means that the operating proﬁt made by an individual ﬁrm exactly covers
its ﬁxed costs.
Now we ask whether an n−type equilibrium is sustainable, in the sense that
if all ﬁrms are n−types,n os i n g l eﬁrm would want to become a v −type when
all others remained n−types.Aﬁrm will set up a second assembly plant abroad
only if the increase in its ﬁxed cost is more than compensated by the increase
11The free entry condition assumes that the number of ﬁrms N adjusts until each ﬁrm earns
zero proﬁts; we can therefore use the condition that, in equilibrium, operating proﬁts equals
ﬁxed costs.
14in variable proﬁts. The increase in variable proﬁts to the ﬁrm comes from the
increase in sales to foreign consumers, which in turn results from a reduction
in price charged to foreign consumers. Foreign consumers are charged a lower
price by v − type ﬁrms because assembly in the foreign market saves (1 − α) of
the trade costs, compared with shipping the ﬁnished product. The operating











whilst the ﬁxed costs will be
3F + D + G (13)
because there are now two assembly plants. Hence a ﬁr mw o u l dh a v ea ni n c e n -
tive to deviate from n − type to v − type if there are pure proﬁts to be made























− 2F + D + G =0 (14)
When the left-hand side of the above inequality is positive, this means there
are pure proﬁts to be made from switching from n − type to v − type when all
other ﬁrms remain n−type. Rearranging the above, the test for deviation from




3F + D + G
2F + D + G
(15)
Divide through by F,d e ﬁne δ = D
F and γ = G
F and write out the full expressions






which deﬁnes a critical value of t, such that when t is lower than tcrit1,a l l
ﬁrms will be n − types. When trade costs are suﬃciently low, it will not be
12When a ﬁrm changes from being an n−type to a v−type, the price charged by that ﬁrm
in the foreign market will also change. This will aﬀect the denominator in the expressions
above. The ∆’s are not identical in the various equilibria. But if we consider a case in which
only one ﬁrm deviates, the impact on the ∆’s will be insigniﬁcant providing the number of
v a r i e t i e si ss u ﬃciently large, hence the expressions can be simpliﬁed as in {equation].
13To see this, ﬁr s ts e tt h ei n e q u a l i t yt oa ne q u a l i t y ,s ob o t hR H Sa n dL H So ft h ei n e q u a l i t y













σ =2 F +D +G. Now divide one equation by
the other, the
βE
σ and ∆ cancel (see footnote above), and we have 1+Φ1
1+Φ = 3F+D+G
2F+D+G.
15in a ﬁrm’s interest to switch to being v − type. Equation 16 cannot be solved
analytically due to the non-integer power, which occurs twice, but it can be
solved graphically for for sample parameter values of α, δ, γand σ,a si nF i g u r e
1b e l o w . 14
Figure 1
The crossing point of the curve that plots the ﬁr s tt e r ma n dt h el i n et h a t
plots the second term from the equation above illustrates tcrit1 for the sample
parameter values.15
14Figure 1 uses the following parameter values: α =0 .3,: δ =1 , γ =3and σ =3 .
15The fact that the curve is not monotonically increasing in t misleadingly suggests a second
critical value of t. In fact the second crossing point is not relevant to this model. The intuition
behind this second crossing point is that when there is a binary choice between n − type and
v − type ﬁrms, at some rather high level of t the trade costs associated with shipping the
component are so high that they seriously diminish the market share of the X
v−type
hf goods,
that it is no longer worth having an assembly plant abroad. This crossing point is irrelevant
in our model, as there is a three-way choice of ﬁrm type, and a anther level of trade costs,
higher than tcrit1 deﬁned above, but lower than the second crossing point in Figure 1, ﬁrms
reconﬁgure to become m − types, avoiding trade costs totally.. Note that when α is big, the
turning point of the curve occurs at lower values of t. The implicit equation deﬁning the








16To check that this is a unique value of tcrit1 separating the choice between
n − type and v − type ﬁrms, consider now an equilibrium in which all ﬁrms are
v−types. Under what condition would a single ﬁrm want to deviate from being
a v−type ﬁrm to an n−type, given that all other ﬁrms remain v−types.T h e
intuition here is that when trade costs are low enough, the best option for the
ﬁrm is to concentrate production in a single location and export to the foreign
market. A ﬁrm would only wish to deviate from the v−type equilibrium if there
is an increase in proﬁts that comes from the saving in ﬁxed cost of the second
assembly plant that more than oﬀsets the reduction in revenue that results from
having to charge a higher price to foreign consumers due to increased trade costs
on the export of the ﬁnished product. This increase in proﬁt occurs when the













which provides an identical deﬁnition of tcrit1 as we obtained in 16 above.
To summarise, we can write:
Result 1: when t<t crit1,a l lﬁrms are n − types.
m − type equilibrium Now imagine an equilibrium in which all ﬁrms are
m-types which means all ﬁrms operate as horizontal multinationals, with both a
components factory and an assembly plant abroad, supplying the foreign mar-







=2 ( F + D)+G (17)
We now consider, under what conditions would a single ﬁrm want to deviate
from being an m − type ﬁrm to become a v − type ﬁrm when all other ﬁrms
remain m−type.I n t u i t i v e l y , f o r a ﬁrm to want to become v−type,t h es a v i n g s
in ﬁxed costs due to closing the components factory abroad must more than
oﬀset the reduction in variable proﬁts that occurs: as the ﬁrm now pays trade
For high values of sigma, the implicit equation also yields a number of negative and imagi-
nary roots, which are irrelevant to our analysis here.
17costs on the components, and passes these costs onto the consumers, the higher
consumer price for that variety of X is accompanied by a reduction in demand,
and hence a fall in variable proﬁts for the ﬁrm. The expression for a ﬁrm to



















− (4F +2 D + G)=0 (18)
Rearranging the above, the test for deviation from m−type to v−type is when




3F + D + G
4F +2 D + G
(19)





4+2 δ + γ
=0 (20)
F o rc o m p a r i s o nw i t ht h eﬁgure deﬁning tcrit1, we solve this equation graphically
for sample parameter values of α, δ, γand σ, as in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Deﬁning tcrit2
18The crossing point between the ﬂat line and the curve deﬁnes the value of
tcrit2 that solves 20 sample parameter values.16
To check that this is a unique deﬁnition of tcrit2 characterising the choice
between m − type to v − type ﬁrms, imagine an equilibrium in which all ﬁrms
are v − types, and consider under what conditions a single ﬁrm would want to
deviate to become an m−type whilst all others remain v−types.A ﬁrm would
want to deviate from v−type to m−type if the increase in variable proﬁts from
increased foreign sales more than oﬀsets the increase in ﬁxed cost due to the



















− (3F + D + G)=0 (21)
Rearranging the above, the test for deviation from v−type to m−type is when




4F +2 D + G
3F + D + G
We can rearrange this to provide an implicit equation that deﬁnes tcrit2.
2
1+( 1+ατcrit2)(1−σ) −
4+2 δ + γ
3+δ + γ
=0 (22)
which provides an identical deﬁnition of tcrit2 as the equation above.
To summarise, we can write:
Result 2: when t>t crit2,a l lﬁrms are m − types.
16Figure 2 uses the following parameter values: α =0 .3,: δ =1 , γ =3and σ =3 .I t i s
imported from maple ﬁle ”fdimn_t_crit_1_and_2”.
19v−type equilibrium A, and B are two equations that deﬁne tcrit1 and tcrit2
respectively. I will now show that these two equations deﬁne the parameter
space, determining for which combinations of parameters we ﬁnd n − type,
v − type and m − type ﬁrms.
In Result 1 and Result 2 above, we have characterised the decision choice
when t is less than tcrit1 or greater than tcrit2. In demonstrating that these two
critical values of t deﬁne single switching points between n −type and v −type
and m − type and v − type respectively, we have also shown two other things.
First, we have shown that if a ﬁrm is a v−type and t is a little above tcrit1,t h e
ﬁrm would choose to remain a v − type. Secondly, we have also shown that if
a ﬁrm is a v − type and t is a little below tcrit2,t h eﬁr mw o u l dw i s ht or e m a i n
a v − type. This suggests that when t lies between tcrit1 and tcrit2 the optimal
choice for ﬁrms is v −type. We now need to demonstrate that in general, tcrit1
is less than tcrit2, and so verify the existence of a parameter space in which the
optimal choice of ﬁrm type is v−type. We can show this graphically for sample
parameter values by plotting the four curves that are described in 16 and 20





Figure 3: Demonstrating tcrit1 <t crit2
Point A indicates the value of tcrit1 that solves 16 for the given sample
20parameters; point B indicates the value of tcrit2 that solves 20 for the given
sample parameters.17 In the example illustrated by Figure 3, tcrit1 is clearly
less than tcrit2.
We can also show numerically, for a series of parameter values, that tcrit1 is
less than tcrit2. The table below shows the values of tcrit1 and tcrit2 for various
combinations of α and σ.18 In this table I report only the single economically
meaningful positive root for each case, where this exists.19
tcrit1; tcrit2 σ =1 .5 σ =2 σ =2 .5 σ =3 σ =4
α =0 .11 .3 ; 22 0.48 ; 8.00 .30 ; 4.70 .21 ; 3.40 .14 ; 2.2
α =0 .21 .9 ; 11 0.61 ; 4.00 .36 ; 2.40 .26 ; 1.70 .16 ; 1.1
α =0 .3 ∗ 0.85 ; 2.70 .47 ; 1.60 .33 ; 1.10 .20 ; 0.7
α =0 .4 ∗ 2.00 ; 2.00 .70 ; 1.20 .46 ; 0.80 .27 ; 0.5
α =0 .5 ∗∗ ∗ ∗ 0.50 ; 0.7
Notice that when σ =2and α =0 .4,w eﬁnd that tcrit1 = tcrit2(= 2).
When the two tcrits take on the same value, this means there is a value of
t, below which n − type ﬁrms are the most proﬁtable type, and above which
m−type ﬁrms are preferred; there is no parameter space in which v−type ﬁrms
are preferred because α is too high.. The intuition here is that economies of
scale are not suﬃciently concentrated in components production to warrant the
fragmentation of production, given the structure of trade costs and in particular
the fraction of trade costs associated with transporting the component.
Next we establish analytically under what conditions tcrit1 <t crit2. Recall
we have two implicit equations 16 and 20 that deﬁne tcrit1 and tcrit2 respectively.









Writing an additional condition tcrit1 = tcrit2 and substituting the above ex-















17T h es a m p l ep a r a m e t e rv a l u eu s e dt op l o tF i g u r e3a r eα =0 .25,: δ =1 , γ =5and σ =3 .5.
[Plotted in Maple with points added in Powerpoint.)
18The values of tcrit1and tcrit2 shown in this table are calculated using δ =1and γ =3 .
19∗ indicates there are no real roots to the equation deﬁning tcrit1for this combination of
parameters
21The above is a condition on α, such that when this condition holds, tcrit1
and tcrit2 are equalised.
Using the numerical results in the table above to guide the inequality, we
can write:














Conversely, when α is equal to or greater than the above expression, there
is no parameter space in which v − type ﬁrms can exist.20The model reduces
to the Markusen model with a straightforward choice between n − type and
m−type ﬁrms. The intuition here is that when the trade costs associated with
the components reach a certain level, it would never make sense to manufacture
the component at home and complete the assembly abroad. This is because the
economies of scale are not suﬃciently concentrated in component production to
justify fragmentation of the type described in section 2 above.
Combining the three results above, we have:
Result 4: when tcrit1 <t crit2 and tcrit1 <t<t crit2,a l lﬁrms are
v-types. This result demonstrates that there is a possibility that a v − type
equilibrium occurs at intermediate values of t .21 The exact breadth of the
intermediate values of t that will sustain the v − type equilibrium depends on
the remaining parameters, and we explore these below.
20The direction of the inequality is established by intuition and veriﬁed using numerical
results.
21The parameters used to draw this ﬁgure are: σ =3 .5, γ =5 , and α =0 .35.




























































Figure 4: Segmentation of parameter space for ﬁrm types
To summarise the equilibrium analysis, we have the result that, depending
on the parameter values, there are three possible types of equilibrium: all ﬁrms
operate a single production facility, servicing both markets from their home
base; all ﬁrms operate two production facilities,serving their home market from
their home-based plant and their foreign market from their FDI facilities; or
all ﬁrms have operate a single chassis production facility, which supplies the
intermediate good to the both the home and foreign assembly plants.
For completeness and to facilitate comparison with other models, I now
consider the case where the choices open to ﬁrms is either to export the ﬁnished
product; or to produced the whole product in the export market. In this case
there, following the logic from above, at some point a level of trade costs at
which an n − type ﬁrm would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to switch to being an m − type.
We call this level of trade costs tcrit0.
The following indirect equation deﬁnes tcrit0, the level of trade costs at which
ﬁrms switch from n − type to m − type (or vice versa) when there is a simple
choice between two ﬁrm types and no option to fragment production.
2
1+( 1+tcrit0)(1−σ) −
4+2 δ + γ
2+δ + γ
=0 (25)
234C o m p a r a t i v e S t a t i c s
In this section we consider the eﬀect of key parameters α, δ, γ and σ on the
critical values of tcrit1 and tcrit1.
4.1 The inﬂuence of α
Recall that the parameter a represents the value of the component as a pro-
portion of the ﬁnished product. Consider how a change in α would aﬀect the
critical value of t at which ﬁrms would want to establishing an assembly plant
in the foreign market and thus ”switch” from n−type to v−type .T a k i n g t h e





1+( 1+αt)σ − α(1 + (1 + t)σ)
Signing this, we see the numerator is clearly positive, whilst the denominator is






> (1 + t)σ (26)
The ﬁrst term in the above expression is the savings in trade costs when assembly
is performed locally. The second term is a measure of the premium on the price
of foreign goods charged to consumers when the foreign goods are assembled
locally. The term on the right-hand side is a measure of the price premium
on foreign goods that consumers are charged when the goods are imported.
Numerical analysis demonstrates that the denominator is almost always positive
provided neither σ nor t nor α are too large. So 26 will be positive provided
both σ, t and α are suﬃciently small.
We can summarise:
Result 5: As α becomes smaller, for plausible parameter values,
the lower is the value of t that makes it worth setting up the
assembly plant abroad.
We now consider the impact of α on tcrit2.T a k i n g t h e t o t a l d i ﬀerential of






This expression is clearly negative, so a fall in α will result in a higher tcrit2.
This gives us:
24Result 6: when α is small, trade costs can be relatively high before
ﬁrms switch from v − type to m − type.
Combining Result 5 and Result 6 we have:
Proposition 1: a small α expands the range of parameters which
sustain v − type ﬁrms.
This proposition is illustrated in the pair of diagrams below.22 In Figure 5a
the range of trade costs over which (for a given d) ﬁrms are v−types is narrow,
compared with Figure 5b, where all parameters used in the plot are identical












































































































Figure 5b: Equilibrium ﬁrm types with low α
22Self-reminder in case change required: these diagrams are from excel spreadsheet ”cal-
culating t-critical” using numbers generated in maple worksheet ”t_crit_numerical”.
25Another interesting thing about alpha is that when alpha is relatively large,
theremaybenov-typeﬁrms. For example Figure 6 illustrates a two-dimensional
segmentation of the parameter space for sample parameters σ =2 ,γ=3 , and
α =0 .4. In this case for relatively low values of δ, there is a binary choice
between n − type and m − type ﬁrms, even though the technology allows frag-
mentation, and v − type ﬁrms only exist for relatively high values of δ.T h e
intuition here is that when delta is small the economies of scale are not more
intense in the components production compared with assembly. From this we
learn that fragmentation will only occur when the relative economy of scale for
production of components compared with the cost of trading components is suf-
ﬁciently large compared with economies of scale in assembly. Thus that when
α is high, and δ is relatively low, there may be no parameter space in which
v − type ﬁrms exist.























































alpha is a fraction that represents the cost of transporting components compared
with the cost of transporting the ﬁnished good. Hence (1 − α) is the saving in
26transport costs associated with fragmented production compared exporting the
ﬁnished good.
274.2 The inﬂuence of δ
In this section we consider the inﬂuence of δ on the critical values of t. Recall δ
is deﬁned as D
F ,w h e r eD is the diﬀerence between the ﬁxed cost of components
plant and the ﬁxed cost of the assembly plant, and F is the ﬁxed cost of the
assembly plant. Hence δ = Fc−Fa
Fa . We can interpret δ as a measure of
t h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h eﬁxed costs associated with the importance of
producing components, compared with the ﬁxed cost of assemble. A high delta
means that the components factory is much more expensive than an assembly
plant. When δ =0 ,t h eﬁxed plant costs are split equally between components
and assembly. If delta is negative, the assembly plant entails higher ﬁxed costs
than the components factory. Given that the ﬁxed costs of the components
factory cannot be negative, (i.e.. Fc ≥ 0), the deﬁnition of δ creates a natural
restriction on δ such that δ ≥− 1.N o t e t h a t δ =1when Fc ≥ 0. When the
two elements of production require same ﬁxed investment, D =0 .W h e n D i s
zero, the economies of scale is equal between the two stages of production. As a
focal case we make a working assumption that economies of scale are greater in
the production of the component compared with assembly. In such case, δ>0.
When δ =1 ,t h eﬁxed costs of associated with producing the component are
exactly double the ﬁxed costs associated with assembly. A large delta indicates
big economies of scale in component production relative to assembly.




(1 + (1 + t)(1−σ))2(σ − 1)
(2 + δ + γ)2[α(1 + αt)−σ(1 + (1 + t)(1+σ)) − (1 + t)−σ(1 + (1 + αt)(1+σ))]
This expression is ambiguous and depends on:
α(1 + t)(1 + t)σ ≶ (1 + αt)(1 + αt)σ
but for when numerical examples are examined it turns out that almost all





This means that when δ is high, the we expect a relatively low value for tcrit1.
So we can write:
Result 7: a large δ LOWERS the level of trade costs at which it
becomes beneﬁcial for a ﬁrm to set up a second assembly plant.





[1 + (1 + αt)−σ +( 1+αt)−σαt]2(1 + αt)σ(2 + γ)
2α(σ − 1)(3 + δ + γ)2 > 0
28This is clearly positive, so we can write:
Result 8: a large δ RAISES the level of trade costs at which it
becomes beneﬁcial for a ﬁrm to set up a second components factory.
C o m b i n i n gR e s u l t s7a n d8w eh a v e :
Proposition 2: a large delta expands the range of trade costs over
which we ﬁnd v − type ﬁrms.
To summarise, we ﬁnd that smaller the α (i.e., the LESS the trade costs
are concentrated in the component) and the greater the δ (i.e., the MORE
the economies of scale are concentrated in the component), the greater is the
parameter space for v − type ﬁrms.
4.3 Other parameters (σ and γ)
When sigma is very small we expect an n − type equilibrium, because for a
small sigma the level of trade costs at which ﬁrms would want to deviate from
an n − type equilibrium is too high to be meaningful, regardless of the other
parameter values. Here σ acts as a measure of the openness of the economy,
with a low σ representing a relatively open economy.
As σ increases, the value of both tcrit1 and tcrit2 becomes lower, until tcrit1
becomes low enough that a switch could be optimal. As σ increases further,
the range of trade costs over which v − types are found narrows. When sigma
is small (less than 2) gamma must be high to get a meaningful result. As
sigma approaches 1, the size of gamma necessary for the result to be meaningful
becomes very high.
GAMMA - the derivative of the implicit equation deﬁning tcrit1 with respect
to γ is the same as that with respect to δ. (i.e. ambiguous but almost always
negative.) Thus a high value of γ implies a relatively low level of trade costs
at which a ﬁr mw o u l dw i s ht os w i t c hf r o mn - t y p et ov - t y p e .B u tt h ed e r i v a t i v e
with resepct to γ for the equation deﬁning tcrit2 has the opposite sign to that
for δ.W e ﬁnd
dt crit2
dγ < 0. Thus a large gamma also reduces the value of trade
costs at which a ﬁrm would want to switch from v − type to m − type.
Note that γ must be positive for the model to be deﬁned. A large γ implies
that overheads are large, and intuitively the number of ﬁrms will be fewer.
295 Volumes of trade and FDI, number of vari-
eties, total ﬁx e dc o s t sa n dw e l f a r e
In this section I establish the volumes of trade and sales from foreign aﬃliates
that occur for varying levels of trade costs; consider the number of varieties
yielded by the solution to the model; examine total ﬁxed costs; and determine
the levels of welfare that prevail.
5.1 Volume of trade
Here I calculate the volume of trade. The volume of trade (VT)i sd e ﬁned as
the sum of worldwide exports. Within the model, this translates into the world
consumption of non-local varieties, (or rather, the imported fraction thereof),











where N ≡ n + v + m and n, v and m are respectively the number of n − type,
v−type and m−type ﬁrms in H; foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk.
To obtain the volume of imports, we multiply the consumption of each variety
by the fraction of the ﬁnished good that is actually imported; and to obtain the
volume of exports we multiply the whole lot by 1+t to allow for the amount
that ”melts” during transit.
Section 3 above establishes that the instantaneous equilibria yields a single
type of ﬁrm. We therefore need to specify the volume of imports that occurs
in each type of equilibrium.
In the n−type equilibrium 100% of the foreign variety consumed is imported.














and can be simulated using sample parameter values.
23As the model speciﬁes symmetric countries, there is no trade in the Z good to worry
about.
30Specifying volume of trade in the v − type equilibrium is only slightly more
tricky. Recall that in this case, only the component crosses an international
border. In section 2 above we deﬁned the value of the component as fraction α1
of the value of the ﬁnished good x. This is slightly distinct from α, which is the
fraction of trade costs associated with shipping the component alone. In theory
it makes little diﬀerence whether α is equal to α1 or not, but we wish to allow
for the practical possibility of α<α 1, which means that shipping intermediate
goods may be proportionally less expensive compared with shipping ﬁnal goods.
For simplicity, to simulate volumes of trade in the v−type equilibrium we assume











2α(1 + t)(1 + αt)−σ
1+Φ1
βE
and can be simulated using sample parameter values.
The simplest case to specify relates to the m − type equilibrium, in which
horizontal multinationals produce their whole product from start to ﬁnish in
each market. Thus there is no trade and the fraction imported is zero: VTm =
0.
Figure 7 depicts the volume of trade that would occur at various levels of
trade costs for the three types of equilibria.
31Figure 7: Volume of Trade
5.2 Sales from foreign aﬃliates
Id e ﬁne sales from foreign aﬃliates as the volume of consumption of goods of
foreign origin that are produced locally. In inward investment fora, this is
referred to as local value-added. In this section I derive expressions for the
volumes of sales from foreign aﬃliates that occur in each of the three equilibria.
Derivation of these expressions is straightforward following on from the section
on volume of trade.
In the n−type equilibrium, all foreign goods that are consumed are imported,
and there are no sales from foreign aﬃliates. (SFAn =0 ) . In the v − type
32equilibrium, the component is imported, but the assembly is performed locally.
The volume of sales from foreign aﬃliates therefore equates to (1 − α1) of the
volume of foreign goods consumed, which when α = α1 is:
SFAv =
2(1 − α)(1 + αt)−σ
1+Φ1
βE
which is a declining function of t.I n t h e m−type equilibrium, consumer price
of foreign varieties is the same as the consumer price of home varieties, and so
consumers consume the same amount of each variety. Hence the volume of
sales from foreign aﬃliates is given by SFAm = βE.
Figure 5.2 uses the curves show in Figure 5.1 together with the expressions
for sales from foreign aﬃliates and solutions to tcrit1 and tcrit2 for sample pa-
rameters of δ and γ to show how the volume of trade and sales from foreign
aﬃliates changes as trade costs increase and the equilibrium moves from one
type to another.
33Figure 5.2: Volume of trade and foreign value-added
Figure 5.2 illustrates that, for plausible parameter values and for a wide range
of trade costs, we anticipate trade in tandem with sales from foreign aﬃliates
and FDI.
5.3 Number of varieties
In Dixit-Stiglitz models, the number of varieties is determined endogenously
and is a function of per-ﬁrm ﬁx e dc o s t sw h i c hw ed e n o t ea sFy−type,w h e r ey
speciﬁes the type of ﬁrm. Using the free entry condition to equate ﬁxed costs
and operating proﬁts, and recalling that operating proﬁt equals revenue divided




34In the single country Dixit-Stiglitz model, revenue per ﬁrm is total revenue for
the X − sector divide by the number for ﬁrms. In the two-country model,
each ﬁrm receives revenue from two sources, Home and Foreign.A n d i n t u r n ,
Home expenditure on X is split between varieties of X produced at Homeme
and varieties of X produced in Foreign. However, using the result that we
have established in section 3 above, which is that in this model with symmetric
countries, all ﬁrms are of a similar type and there are no mixed equilibria, all
ﬁrms must be identical in scale. So revenue per ﬁrm equals
βE
N where Ny is
the total number of ﬁrms of a single type in one economy. Substituting this




where Fy−type is the per-ﬁrm ﬁxed cost for the type of ﬁrm that prevails in
equilibrium. It follows that we have:
n = n∗ =
βE
σFn−type (27)
v = v∗ =
βE
σFv−type (28)
m = m∗ =
βE
σFm−type (29)
Thus the number of ﬁrms in equilibrium will vary with the type of equilib-
rium that prevails. Given the breakdown of ﬁxed costs and how these vary with
type of ﬁrm (described in section 2 above), we know that Fn−type <Fv−type <
Fm−type ,s ow ec a nd e t e r m i n e :
n>v>m
which means that the number of ﬁrms in an n − txpe equilibrium will, ceteris
parabus, be greater than the number of ﬁrms in a v − type equilibrium, which
in turn will be greater than the number of ﬁrms in an m − type equilibrium.
These expressions for the number of ﬁrms are used in the analysis of welfare in
sub-section 5.5 below.
5.4 Total ﬁxed costs
Total expenditure in one country on ﬁxed costs is given by ﬁxed costs per ﬁrm
multiplied by the number of ﬁrms.24 In this model the ﬁxed cost per ﬁrm is
24For a particular equilbrium, we can wirte, Ftotal = Ny−type ∗ Fy−type ,w h i c hh o l d si n
a situation where all ﬁrms are the same type. In a two-country mixed- equilibrium the total
ﬁxed cost would be:
TFC =( n + n∗)(2F + D + G)+( v + v∗)(3F + D + G)+( m + m∗)(4F +2 D + G)
35diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of ﬁrm. But as we have shown above, the number




where F is the ﬁxed cost per ﬁrm. So for a particular equilibrium we can write,





Hence economy-wide expenditure on ﬁxed costs is constant, and is independent
of the type of equilibrium that prevails.
Thus it turns out that total ﬁxed costs (TFC)a sm e a s u r e do na ne c o n o m y -
wide or worldwide basis are constant for all levels of trade costs. This is an
interesting result in itself, as it is not obvious that this would be the case in
our model. The constancy of total ﬁxed cost occurs despite the fact that, as
trade costs rise, the type of ﬁrm that prevails in equilibrium changes, entailing
diﬀerent per-ﬁrm ﬁxed costs. An intuitive understanding of constant ﬁxed
costs despite the changing equilibria rests on the idea that is the number of
ﬁrms that adjusts endogenously to preserve total economy-wide expenditure on
ﬁxed costs. Speciﬁcally, when t is lower than tcrit1, and an n−type equilibrium
prevails, the equilibrium number of ﬁrms is higher than the number of ﬁrms in a
v−type equilibrium that occurs when t is a little higher than tcrit1. Similarly, if
w ec o n s i d e rt h ec h a n g ef r o mav −type equilibrium to an m−type equilibrium,
(this happens in our model if t rises from just below tcrit1 to just above tcrit2),
the number of ﬁrms will decline further.
The per-ﬁrm ﬁxed costs varies from one equilibrium to another. But in the
shift to a diﬀerent equilibrium it is the number of ﬁrms that adjusts and thus
preserves the economy-wide ﬁxed costs at a constant level.
5.5 Welfare
In this section I look at welfare. Welfare is most easily measured by evaluat-
ing the indirect utility function. The indirect utility function is obtained by
substituting the expressions for quantities consumed into the utility function to
obtain an expression for utility in terms of prices of all goods and expenditure.






































36Recall that due to mill-pricing, the consumer prices of foreign-produced goods
vary with location of production.
In the model expounded in this paper, we have established that there are
no opportunities for mixed equilibria to occur, and that either an n − type,a
v − type or an m − type equilibrium occurs. This simpliﬁes the evaluation
of welfare. Consumer prices of foreign-produced goods and a price index can
be deﬁned for the diﬀerent types of equilibria.25 Substituting these into the
indirect utility function, together with the expressions for N derived above,
we obtain expressions to evaluate welfare levels as a function of t and various
parameters under each of the three types of equilibria, expressed in terms of
pure parameters and exogenous variables.
Deﬁning Wy to be the welfare achieved under a y −type equilibrium, where


























































































Thus welfare in the n − type and v − type equilibria is a function of t,a n d
depends also on the other exogenous variables such as income and the β from
the Cobb-Douglas upper tier, and on parameters such as α, σ and per-ﬁrm ﬁxed
costs. Welfare in the m − type equilibrium does not depend on t. Figure 8
below plots the three curves as functions of t.





fh =1+t; and P
m−type
fh =1+αt.
Working on the denominator from the sub-utility function, the price index for the home
country will be:
∆ =( n + v + m)(Phh)1−σ + n∗(Pfh)1−σ + v∗(Pfh)1−σ + m∗(Pfh)1−σ
In a symmetric equilibrium, n = n∗, v = v∗ and m = m∗. Expressions for price are
calculated in [reference] above. Thus:
∆n = n(1 + Φ), ∆v = v(1 + Φ1) and ∆m =2 m.
37Figure 8: Welfare-maximising location decisions
The graph shows that, when trade costs are low, welfare is highest under the
n−type equilibrium. Then as trade costs rise to an intermediate level, welfare
is maximised by a v − type equilibrium. And when trade costs are high, the
highest level of welfare is achieved by an m − type equilibrium.
It turns out that the crossing points of the welfare contours occur at t = tcrit1
and t = tcri2. The implications of this are most interesting: Figure 5.3 shows
that the maximum welfare achievable when t<t crit1 occurs for an n − type
equilibrium; that the maximum welfare achievable when tcrit1 <t<t crit2
occurs for a v − type equilibrium; and that the maximum welfare achievable
when t>t crit2 occurs for an m − type equilibrium. This leads to:
38Proposition 3:
The location choices made by proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms
leads to a welfare-maximising outcome
from the consumers’ perspective.
The intuition is that welfare is highest when trade costs are very low and
an n − type equilibrium prevails. As trade costs rise, welfare falls because the
amount of resources that ”melts” during shipping increases, thus less of the
imported varieties are consumed. Then, as trade costs continue rising, at some
point there is a switch to the v − type equilibrium. When this switch is made,
the number of ﬁrms adjusts downwards and welfare is reduced as the number
of varieties falls. Welfare continues falling, albeit at a less steep rate, as trade
costs continue rising, until there is a ﬁnal switch to an m − type equilibrium.
Again the number of ﬁrms adjusts downwards, thus reducing welfare through
the loss of variety.
The ﬁgure also demonstrates an increase in welfare due to fragmentation.
The vertical height of the central triangle, labeled ”Area A”, shows the gain in
welfare eﬀected by fragmentation, compared with a situation where technology
were to force a straight choice between n − type and m − type ﬁrms.26
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper models trade and FDI in a world consisting of two symmetric coun-
tries. Using a monopolistic competition model of international trade which
includes positive trade costs and endogenous multinational ﬁrms, we introduce
an intermediate good and allow ﬁrms to fragment production internationally.
The result is that under certain conditions, identical countries engage in both
intra-industry FDI and intra-industry, intra-ﬁrm trade. This result provides a
theoretical explanation for a well-observed but little explained phenomenon in
the overlap between the theory of international trade and the theory of multi-
national enterprises. Examination of welfare demonstrates that ﬁrms make
location choices that happen to maximise consumer welfare.
26By contrast, in the case where we have an alpha suﬃcently large as to preclude a v−type
equilibrium, this is illustrated on the welfare map as the Wv−type curve lying below either or
both Wn−tpye and Wm−type for all levels of trade costs.
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